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Abstract 
Purpose – The paper aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on dividend policy of 
listed firms in Turkey. Particularly, it attempts to uncover the effects of family involvement 
(through ownership and board representation), non-family blockholders (foreign investors, 
domestic financial institutions and the state), and minority shareholders on dividend decisions in 
the post-2003 period as it witnesses the major economic and structural reforms. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper employs alternative dividend policy measures (the 
probability of paying dividends, dividend payout ratio and dividend yield) and uses appropriate 
regression techniques (logit and tobit models) to test the research hypotheses, by focusing on a 
recent large panel dataset of 264 ISE-listed firms (non-financial and non-utility) over a ten-year 
period 2003-2012. 
 
Findings – The empirical results show that foreign and state ownership are associated with a 
less likelihood of paying dividends, while other ownership variables (family involvement, 
domestic financial institutions and minority shareholders) are insignificant in affecting the 
probability of paying dividends. However, all the ownership variables have a significantly 
negative impact on dividend payout ratio and dividend yield. Hence, the paper presents 
consistent evidence that increasing ownership of foreign investors and the state in general 
reduce the need for paying dividends in the Turkish market.  
 
Research limitations/implications – Due to the absence of empirical research on how 
ownership structure may affect dividend policy and the data unavailability for earlier periods in 
Turkey, the paper cannot make comparison between the pre-and post-2003 periods. 
Nevertheless, this paper can be a valuable benchmark for further research.  
 
Practical implications – The paper reveals that cash dividends are not used as a monitoring 
mechanism by investors in Turkey and the expropriation argument through dividends for Turkish 
families is relatively weak. Accordingly, the findings of this paper may benefit policy makers, 
investors and fellow researchers, who seek useful guidance from relevant literature.  
 
Originality/value – To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the 
link between ownership structure and dividend policy in Turkey after the implementation of 
major reforms in 2003. 
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1 Introduction  
In their classic study, Berle and Means (1932) emphasised the predominance of widely 
held corporations where ownership structure is dispersed among small shareholders but the 
control is concentrated in the hands of managers. The image of Berle and Means widely held 
corporation is extensively accepted in finance literature as a common structural form for large 
firms in the well-developed common law countries (such as the US, UK, Canada, and Australia). 
In this respect, one of the most widely studied explanations for why firms pay dividends is the 
agency cost theory, which derives from the problems involved with the separation of 
management (the agent) and ownership (the principal), and the differences in managerial and 
shareholder priorities, also known as the principal-agent conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
This theory argues that cash dividends can be used as a tool to mitigate agency problems in a 
company by reducing free cash flow and forcing management to enter the capital market for 
financing, hence leading to induce monitoring by the market (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; 
Jensen, 1986). Prior research has paid extensive amounts of attention to the principal-agency 
conflict and mostly focused on the developed countries, where financial markets are well-
regulated and relatively transparent; mostly contain the publicly-held firms with dispersed 
ownership and the control is in the hands of professional managers.  
In contrast, outside the developed countries, renowned cross-country studies have 
provided evidence that concentrated ownership is the prevailing form of the ownership structure 
in most developing economies. For instance, La Porta et al. (1999) examined the ownership 
structures of large firms in 27 different countries and suggested that relatively a few of these 
firms are widely held; rather they are heavily concentrated and are commonly controlled by 
families or the states. Claessens et al. (2000) reported that single shareholder controls more than 
two-thirds of publicly listed East Asian firms and families dominate about 40% of all listed 
companies. Furthermore, Faccio et al. (2001) found that families, which often supplied a top 
manager, are the main players in East Asia and Western Europe. According to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), family-owned firms govern a majority of the developing economies in South 
America. Consequently, increasing evidence reveals that ownership structure is heavily 
concentrated in developing economies; mainly family-controlled firms are widespread around 
the world and engage a growing importance in the economic globe.  
Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that when large shareholders, especially 
family owners, hold almost full control, they tend to generate private benefits of control (such as 
expending the companies’ cash flow, paying themselves extreme salaries, providing top 
managerial positions and board seats to their family members). In these cases, the prominent 
agency problem is therefore expropriation of the wealth of minority owners by the controlling 
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shareholders, which is the conflict between controlling shareholders (principal) and minority 
shareholders (principal), in other words the principal-principal conflict. Likewise, Villalonga 
and Amit (2006) stated that families tend to have more motivation to expropriate minority 
shareholders’ wealth than any other controlling large shareholders. Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
emphasised that family owners may act for their own interests over the other investors, such as 
by lessening firm risk, enhancing their control at the cost of minority owners, and misusing 
internal resources by participating in non-profitable projects that benefit them. In this respect, 
Daily et al. (2003) suggested that agency cost theory may function differently in family-
controlled publicly listed firms, and that prior findings from widely held corporations may not 
readily generalise into this setting. Accordingly, it is extremely important to consider ownership 
structure of companies in developing (emerging) markets in understanding dividend policy 
related to the agency problems in these markets.  
As in many other emerging markets, the concentrated ownership structure (by large 
controlling shareholders) has been the prevailing form in Turkey, where corporate ownership is 
characterised by highly concentrated family ownership with the existence of other large 
shareholders such as foreign, institutional and state ownerships (Gursoy and Aydogan, 1999; 
Yurtoglu, 2003; IIF, 2005; Sevil et al., 2012). Prior studies (e.g. Ararat and Ugur, 2003; IIF, 
2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006) pointed out various corporate governance problems and the lack 
of efficient transparency and disclosure practices experienced by Turkish firms until the early 
2000s. These included the concentrated and pyramidal ownership structures dominated by 
families, inconsistent and unclear accounting and tax regulations, and weak minority 
shareholders’ protection, which all create an environment that may easily foster corruption, share 
dilution, assets stripping, tunnelling, insider trading and market manipulation.
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However, the new Turkish government (following the November 2002 elections, which 
resulted in a one-party government, the political uncertainty to some degree faded away) signed 
a standby agreement with the IMF and began to implement major economic programs and 
structural reforms for a better working of the market economy, outward-orientation and 
globalisation, starting March 2003 (CMB, 2003; Adaoglu, 2008; Birol, 2011). Furthermore, 
Turkey’s progress in achieving full membership of the EU in this period also provided the 
strongest motivation in establishing new reforms, rules and regulations in line with the EU 
directives and best-practice international standards to improve corporate governance and 
transparency and disclosure practices; therefore, to integrate its economy with Europe and to 
harmonise its institutions with those of the EU (IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006).  
In this context, the Capital Markets Board (CMB) of Turkey attributed great importance 
to improve communications with investors, issuers and other institutions in order to ensure that 
markets are functioning in a safer, more transparent and more efficient manner in accordance 
with regulations that were adopted in harmony with international norms and developments 
                                                          
1
 In fact, during the late 1990s, a considerably long list of cases in tunnelling took place in the Turkish public. 
Majority of these cases were simple resource transfers of controlling shareholders from their firms in the form of 
outright theft or fraud, whereas a number of listed firms’ minority shareholders were harmed by these events; a 
bigger proportion represented wealth transfers from state banks to controlling owners of unlisted firms, involving in 
many cases the visible hands of politicians (Yurtoglu, 2003). Likewise, a number of well-publicised cases revealed 
that unfair treatment of minority shareholders was a serious corporate governance problem in Turkey since 
controlling families had the opportunities to expropriate profits from them, typically through the use of company 
assets or non-arm’s length related party transactions (IIF, 2005). 
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(CMB, 2003). Accordingly, one of the most important developments
2
 was that in cooperation 
with the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the CMB published its Corporate Governance Principles in 2003, which was aimed to 
improve the corporate governance practices of the firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
(ISE).  
Considering the implementation of various major economic and structural reforms 
starting with the fiscal year 2003, and with many areas improved in Turkish corporate 
governance practices, its capital market is still heavily concentrated and characterised by high 
family ownership (IIF, 2005; Caliskan and Icke, 2011). Also, the ISE attracted a significant 
amount of foreign investment during the period 2003-2012 (Adaoglu, 2008; CMB, 2012).
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Moreover, the CMB of Turkey implemented much more flexible mandatory dividend policy 
regulations during this period, which provided more flexibility to the ISE-listed firms in setting 
their own dividend policies. In addition, the Turkish tax regime imposed an uneven tax treatment 
between capital gains and dividends for some investors at the beginning of 2006. Consequently, 
we argue that high stock-ownership concentration might have important implications on 
dividend policy decisions of the listed-firms in Turkey.  
Accordingly, our paper empirically investigates the association between ownership 
structure and dividend policy, which is still unexplored in the emerging Turkish market, over a 
decade after Turkey implemented major economic and structural reforms as well as the 
publication of the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles in 2003. The paper firstly contributes 
to the dividend literature by providing insight about the role of ownership concentration on 
corporate payout decisions in an emerging market (a civil law originated country), which 
employed the common laws in order to integrate with world markets. Second, it examines the 
relationship between family involvement (through ownership and board representation) and 
dividend policy from the principal-principal conflict perspective to identify whether families 
tend to expropriate the wealth from minority investors through dividends after the 
implementation of major reforms in 2003. Third, it also focuses on investigating the effects of 
non-family blockholders (particularly, foreign investors, domestic financial corporations and the 
state) on dividend policy of Turkish firms over the relevant period. Finally, it further attempts to 
detect the relationship between minority shareholders and dividend policy in the Turkish market. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
background and develops the research hypotheses. Sections 3-5 discuss the data sample, 
variables descriptions, and research design and models. Section 6 illustrates the empirical 
findings, and Section 7 concludes the paper.   
 
2 Literature review and research hypotheses  
2.1 Family control and dividend policy  
                                                          
2
  Some other significant developments included the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
restructuring the public and private banking system, and enhancing of scrutiny and supervisory framework to 
minimise credit risk concentration and prevent insider lending, accelerating privatisation of state-owned enterprises, 
and creating private pension and mutual funds to enhance monitoring in public firms’ corporate governance. 
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 This period was indeed greatly attracted to foreign investors. The ratio of stocks owned by foreign investors to 
total stocks in the ISE was 51.5% by the end of 2003 and steadily increased to 72.3% by the end of 2007. Probably, 
due to the 2008 global crisis, this ratio decreased to 67.5% in 2008 and showed a further slightly declining pattern in 
the following years to 65.8% by the end of 2012, which still revealed a serious contribution from foreign investors, 
holding about two-thirds of the total equities in custody in the ISE (CMB, 2003; 2012). 
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In most emerging economies, companies usually have controlling shareholders that hold 
significant fractions of stocks, typically founding families. La Porta et al. (1999) stated that 
family members involve directly in the management of their companies on almost all occasions; 
therefore, family control is a very effective organisation governance way of monitoring 
managers in order to provide more efficient management and supervision, which leads to zero or 
lower owner-manager agency cost (the principal-agent conflict), than other large shareholders or 
dispersed corporations. Nevertheless, due to the absence of sufficient monitoring, family owners 
(since they are the insiders) can increase access to the use of companies’ funds that may lead to 
higher principal-principal conflicts.  
Family owners may use their controlling power to exacerbate the principal-principal 
conflicts in various ways. For instance, Morck and Yeung (2003) identified the “other people’s 
money” problem, which involves the situation in which families have significant control over a 
firm, with very little investment in that firm. Indeed, by the separation between cash flow and 
control rights through pyramidal company structures or multiple classes of voting power of 
shares, controlling shareholders can redirect resources to themselves and gain “private benefits 
of control”, such as paying themselves extreme salaries and providing top managerial positions 
and board seats to their family members although they are not capable (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Another common form of expropriation of wealth from minority owners is referred to as 
“tunnelling”. This is defined as the transfer of assets and profits, within a family-owned business 
group. In this case, the controlling family transfer assets and profits to firms in which they have 
higher ownership, from firms with lower ownership, through non-market prices (Johnson et al, 
2000). In short, the principal-principal conflict may be the salient agency problem and seriously 
harm the interests of minority shareholders in family-controlled firms.  
Another way in which families can exercise control is through board representation. In 
fact, top executives almost always come from the controlling family (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Faccio et al., 2001; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010). The corporate governance literature 
suggests that a firm’s board of directors can play an important role in mitigating agency 
problems, particularly by monitoring executive management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Farinha, 
2003). However, controlling-family members sitting on the boards can reduce the effectiveness 
of the board of directors as a monitoring mechanism by executing policies that benefit 
themselves and hence can increase the costs of potential expropriation of minority shareholders’ 
wealth in the firm (La Porta et al., 1999). 
A few recent studies have investigated and reported mixed evidence concerning whether 
families either mitigate or exacerbate conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, 
and how family control affects corporate dividend policy. Faccio et al. (2001) examined the 
relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure and control in East Asia, compared 
to a benchmark sample of West European firms. Their analysis showed that the prominent 
agency problem in both regions is wealth expropriation by controlling shareholders 
(predominantly the families) from outside shareholders. Especially, this type of expropriation is 
more likely to increase when the corporation is linked up with a subsidiary group of companies 
that are all governed by the same owner, which was found to be the case for about half of the 
firms in Western Europe and East Asia. In addition, the presence of multiple blockholders 
increased dividend payments in Western Europe but decreased in East Asia, implying that other 
large shareholders tend to help reduce the controlling shareholder’s expropriation of minority 
owners in Europe, whereas they seem to exacerbate it in Asia.  
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Chen et al. (2005) reported a significant negative association between dividend payouts 
and family ownership of up to 10% of the firm’s stockholdings and a positive correlation for 
family shareholding between 10% and 35% for only small Hong Kong companies. Moreover, 
Wei et al. (2011) found that families have lower cash dividend payouts and lower tendencies to 
distribute dividends compared to non-family firms in China. Gonzalez et al. (2014) examined the 
effects of family involvement on dividend policy and how family involvement influences agency 
cost problems between large and minority shareholders. Their results showed that family 
influence in relation to the amount and probability of dividend payments varies considerably 
according to the type of family involvement.  
2.3 Other large shareholders, monitoring and dividend policy  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggested that if legal protection does not provide enough 
control rights to small investors, perhaps large shareholders might mitigate the shareholders 
conflict by an efficient monitoring of the management. Grossman and Hart (1980) argued that 
managements of the companies should be monitored, which must be effectively done by larger 
shareholders. The existence of such large shareholders can mitigate the free rider problem of 
monitoring managers and therefore reducing agency costs.  
Large shareholders may take several distinct forms depending on the proportion of shares 
held and the type of legal owners, such as management or board ownership, family and foreign 
shareholders, the state and financial institutions ownerships (La Porta et al., 1999). The identity 
of large shareholder can be an important factor in determining financial polices of corporations.  
2.3.1 Foreign ownership and dividend policy  
Foreign investors with large shareholdings might be efficient monitors of their companies 
in emerging markets, due to their expertise of establishing better global standards and practices. 
Further, foreign ownership increases foreign analysts’ interests in these firms and it is true that 
foreign analysts generally ask managements to disclose their financial policies, providing more 
monitoring on the managements’ activities and hence with less need for the dividend-induced 
monitoring device (Glen et al., 1995; Manos, 2002; Jeon et al., 2011). This suggests a negative 
relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payments. According to Glen et al. (1995), 
most industrial country investors often hold stocks of developing markets for their long-run 
growth potential, not for the short-term cash dividend income they will generate, which also 
suggests a negative correlation between foreign ownership and dividend payments. 
Although foreign investors generally have substantial global investment experiences and 
are in a better position to assess a corporation’s performance, it is however disputed whether 
foreign investors have information disadvantages in trading local stocks, due to geological, 
cultural and political differences. Therefore, the task of monitoring managements in emerging 
markets could be more difficult and costly for foreign investors, which suggests the importance 
of and the need for the dividend-induced capital market monitoring increase, with the increase in 
the percentage of foreign shareholdings, leading to a positive influence of foreign share-
ownership on dividend payments (Manos, 2002; Jeon et al., 2011).  
There is limited evidence in understanding the effect of foreign investors on dividend 
policy in emerging markets. For instance, Lin and Shiu (2003) investigated foreign ownership in 
Taiwan and reported that foreign investors tend to hold shares with low dividend yields, whereas 
Manos (2002) in India and Jeon et al. (2011) in Korea found that they have a preference for 
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dividend-paying companies and therefore larger foreign ownership leads to distribute more 
dividends in these markets.  
2.3.2 Institutional ownership and dividend policy 
Dividends payments push corporations to enter the external capital markets for 
supplementary funding and thus increase the capital market monitoring (Rozeff, 1982; 
Easterbrook, 1984). However, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued 
that institutional blockholders, such as pension funds, insurance companies, investment and unit 
trusts, and banks, might act as a monitoring mechanism on the firm’s management, consequently 
reducing in general the need for high dividend payouts.  
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) argued that institutional shareholders are not likely to 
involve with direct monitoring, due to their arm’s length investment perspective. In fact, 
institutions generally prefer to encourage firms to pay higher dividends, and so they have to 
approach to the external capital market for future financial requirements. Likewise, Farinha 
(2003) suggested that institutions might force companies to pay higher dividends to augment 
better monitoring by capital markets, especially when they think that their own direct monitoring 
exercises are inefficient or too costly. In this case, a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and dividend payout ratio is expected.  
Having analysed the influence of shareholder ownership identity on dividend policy, 
Kouki and Guizani (2009) reported that Tunisian firms paid out lower dividends when they had 
higher institutional ownership, consistent with the effective monitoring role of institutional 
investors. Contrarily, Abdelsalam et al. (2008) documented a positive association between 
institutional ownership and dividend policy decisions of Egyptian companies. Similarly, Manos 
(2002) found the impact of institutional ownership on the payout ratios of Indian firms was 
positive, which is inconsistent with the argument that the ability of institutions in terms of more 
effective monitoring reduces the need for the dividend-induced mechanism. Indeed, this was 
consistent with the dividend-induced monitoring preferences of institutions in India, reflecting 
that greater agency conflicts in the emerging Indian market, hence the level of direct institutional 
monitoring was inefficient. 
2.3.3 State ownership and dividend policy  
State ownership is another common form of concentrated control in some countries, 
particularly in countries with poor shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 1999). It is a fact that 
state firms are generally extremely inefficient, since they tend to use firms to pursue political 
objectives and their losses result in massive deficiencies of their economies, which is contrary to 
the efficiency purpose for their existence (Kikeri et al., 1992). Further, Gugler (2003) argued that 
state-controlled corporations are likely to contain a double principal-agent problem.  Although 
the citizens are the ultimate owners, they do not have direct control on these companies but their 
elected representatives do. However, politicians might not vigorously or accurately monitor the 
state-owned corporation and this leads to even greater principal-agent conflicts between 
managers and the citizen owners of the state-owned corporations. In this respect, elected 
politicians, who are responsible for all government activities, may have a strong preference for 
dividends from a state-owned company, since dividend payments can be good enough to 
convince citizens that the corporation performs well.  
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Moreover, the awareness of massive failure of state companies that causes burdens on 
national budgets in most cases has recently generated a popular world-wide reaction, so called 
“privatisation” that substitutes governmental control with private cash flow ownership and 
control. Privatisation generally provides comparatively more effective organisational structures 
and a substantial enhancement in performance of privatised firms (Megginson et al., 1994). 
However, it is possible that privatisation does not work as well as intended; for instance, when 
companies are privatised in the absence of large owners, which provides managers with more 
discretion. In these cases, agency problems stemmed from managerial control might increase; 
although the inefficiency of governmental control decreases, the problems of managerial 
discretion can be almost as severe as the former problems of governmental control in these 
companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
A few studies showed evidence that firms with high state ownership are characterised by 
high dividend payouts. Gugler (2003) found that principal-agent conflict is more severe in state-
controlled firms in Austria. The study reported that state ownership and control have a positive 
effect on target payout ratios, and state-controlled firms in Austria are more reluctant to cut 
dividends, which is consistent with the managerial agency cost explanation. Wei et al. (2004) 
also showed that there is a significantly positive correlation between the state ownership and 
cash dividends in China. Similarly, Wang et al. (2011) and Lam et al. (2012) showed that 
Chinese firms with higher state ownership are likely to pay higher cash dividends. However, 
Kouki and Guizani (2009) found a significantly negative relationship between dividend per share 
and the state ownership in the context of emerging Tunisian market in contrast with the evidence 
of previously mentioned studies.   
2.4 Minority shareholders and dividend policy  
Conflicts of interest between corporate insiders (for instance, managers) or large 
controlling owners and outside investors (specifically minority shareholders) have been crucial 
to the studies of modern corporations (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Insiders may vary from country to country. For instance, in the US, the UK or Canada, where 
companies are relatively dispersed, typically their managers are in the controlling positions, 
whereas in most other countries - especially in emerging markets, companies are generally 
controlled by large shareholders, such as family owners (La Porta et al., 1999). The insiders who 
control the companies’ assets can use these funds for their own purposes without benefiting 
minority shareholders through various formats such as outright theft, misusing firms’ resources, 
excessive salaries, asset sales (selling other companies that they control at favourable prices) to 
themselves and so on (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000). 
Nevertheless, regardless of the identity of controlling shareholders, the victims are always the 
minority investors (La Porta et al., 2000).  
Even though minority shareholders have stronger protections in countries such as the US 
and UK, researchers hypothesised and reported a positive association between ownership 
dispersion among outside shareholders and dividend payout. The presence of large number of 
small investors leads to a lower ownership concentration level, which increases the possible 
agency problems associated with the free-rider problem due to the higher ownership dispersion 
and the need for outside monitoring. Therefore, Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) 
hypothesised that minority shareholders desire higher dividend payout, since their ability of 
control over companies is weak. Indeed, a string of studies that followed Rozeff’s (1982) work 
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reported a positive relationship between ownership dispersion and dividend payments in 
developed markets, including Schooley and Barney (1994), Moh’d et al. (1995) and Farinha 
(2003).  
Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that, in countries where minority investors 
do not have much protection rights, large investors (generally families, the states or banks) might 
have a controlling power on managers, but this does not still provide enough protection to  
existing and potential minority investors. In this case, La Porta et al. (2000) suggested that these 
minority shareholders would typically seek for dividend payments in order to reduce what is left 
for expropriation. However, in emerging markets such as China, where dividends are taxed as 
ordinary income but capital gains are not, small investors may have preference for capital gains 
over dividends (Wang et al., 2011). According to Wei et al. (2004), small investors in China are 
too poorly informed for even the rights they essentially have, hence they have neither the 
incentive nor the ability to collect information and monitor the managements. They 
characteristically care about the appreciation or depreciation of shares they hold, and depend on 
short-run capital gains rather than cash dividend income. In this respect, an inverse relationship 
can be expected between the proportion of small investors’ shareholdings and dividend payout 
ratio. In fact, Lam et al. (2012) reported that Chinese firms with higher public (small) ownership 
tend to pay lower cash dividends, reflecting the preference of small investors for capital gains 
over dividends, due to the advantageous tax treatment of capital gains and the weak legal 
protections for minority shareholders in China. 
2.5 Research context in Turkey and hypotheses development  
 
Firms listed on the ISE were subject to strict dividend policy regulations, when it first 
started to operate in 1986. According to the first mandatory dividend policy, the ISE-listed firms 
were obliged to distribute at least 50% of their distributable income as a cash dividend, which 
was known as “first dividend” in the Turkish capital market. Without paying the first dividend, 
all other dividend payments (e.g. payments to employers) or maintaining it as retained earnings, 
were not legally possible (Adaoglu, 1999). A limited number of studies (for example, Adaoglu, 
2000; Aivazian et al., 2003) conducted in early periods in Turkey reported that cash dividend 
payments were solely dependent on the firms’ current year earnings as forced by regulations, 
which did not provide the ISE firms much flexibility to set their own dividend policies.  
After the implementation of major reforms in 2003, the CMB of Turkey, however, 
imposed much more flexible mandatory dividend policy regulations. The CMB replaced the 
second mandatory dividend policy that forced the ISE firms to pay at least 20% of their 
distributable income as a first dividend but the listed firms did not have to pay the first dividend 
entirely in cash. They had the option of distributing it in cash dividends or stock dividends or a 
mixture of both, which was subject to the board of directors’ decision. The total payment could 
not, however, be less than 20% of the distributable income for the fiscal year 2003. Further, for 
the fiscal year 2004, the CMB increased the minimum percentage of mandatory dividend 
payments for the ISE-listed firms from 20% to 30%, which also stayed at this level for the fiscal 
year 2005. Then, the minimum percentage of mandatory dividend payment level was again 
reduced to 20% in the fiscal year 2006 and remained at this level for the fiscal years 2007 and 
2008. Nonetheless, from the fiscal year 2009 and onwards (2010, 2011 and 2012), the CMB 
decided to not determine a minimum dividend payout ratio and abolished mandatory minimum 
dividend payment distribution requirement for the ISE firms, which provided total freedom for 
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the ISE-listed firms to make their own dividend policy decisions. In this respect, the heavily 
concentrated ownership structures of the ISE firms might play a crucial role in determining their 
dividend policies in the post-2003 period. 
Before 2006, a 15% withholding tax used to be imposed on all kinds of investment 
instruments (deposits, equities, bonds, mutual funds) regardless of the type of the investor 
(resident/non-resident, individual/corporate). However, the Turkish tax regime on investment 
instruments changed significantly at the beginning of 2006 (TSPAKB, 2007). Under the current 
Turkish tax system, cash dividends and capital gains are taxed differently. Table 1 illustrates a 
summary of the Turkish tax regime of capital gains and cash dividends on equity investments for 
the investors since 2006. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE  
 
As illustrated in the table, foreign investors, both individuals and corporations, are not 
subject to any taxes for capital gains derived from shares, whereas they are taxed with a 15% 
withholding tax rate for their cash dividends distributed on the shares they held. Similarly, 
domestic individual investors are not subject to any taxes for capital gains but they are subject to 
a 15% withholding tax for their cash dividend income. However, domestic corporations’ taxation 
relatively differs from the other types of investors. Domestic corporations are not subject to any 
taxes for both capital gains and cash dividends that derived on equities of resident 
incorporations. It is also important to note that, even though domestic investors, both individuals 
and corporations, are exempt from taxation on capital gains, they are subject to 10% withholding 
tax for capital gains on the shares of investment trusts and exchange traded funds, if held less 
than one year, implying that the Turkish tax system encourages domestic investors to hold these 
type of shares for longer period. 
Corporate dividend literature argues that uneven tax treatment of dividends and capital 
gains may affect investors’ preferences and therefore dividend policy decisions of firms.  For 
instance, the tax preference theory (Brennan, 1970; Elton and Gruber, 1970; Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy, 1979) proposes that investors who receive favourable tax treatment on capital 
gains (lower taxes on capital gains than dividends) might prefer shares with none or low 
dividend payouts, since the income tax on dividends is greater and hence the high dividend 
payments will increase shareholders’ tax burden. Consequently, due to the uneven taxation of 
capital gains and cash dividends in Turkey, the tax factor may also play a role in understanding 
the relationship between ownership structure of the firms, in other words various types of 
investors holding shares of the firms, and cash dividend policy in the emerging Turkish market.  
Moreover, Turkey offers an ideal setting to investigate the relationship between family 
involvement and cash dividends since its corporate ownership structure is characterised by 
highly concentrated family ownership. Although some aspects of the family-owned firm 
structure sharply contrast with the basic concepts of corporate governance, other aspects of it 
may be advantageous in many cases. In family-owned companies, management and ownership 
are not separated, and Turks highly value close family ties. These ties, or sense of belonging to a 
larger social group, have done well in motivating manager employees to work hard for the well-
being of the company. Therefore, overlapping ownership and management may help to minimise 
the managerial agency problems (Izmen, 2003). However, by upholding tight control, family 
members have in some instances obtained well-paid jobs and perks from the company, even if 
they are not capable. Further, controlling families have had the opportunities to expropriate 
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profits from minority investors, typically through the use of company assets or non-arm’s length 
related party transactions (IIF, 2005). Also, Turkish families mostly generate the control through 
the presence of business groups, which are affiliations of industrial and financial companies, 
organised under the legal form of a “holding company” (Yurtoglu, 2003). Hence, the controlling 
families may have strong initiatives to expropriate wealth of minority shareholders, which will 
exacerbate the principal-principal conflict. If this is the case, families would prefer lower 
dividend payments to maintain cash flows that they can potentially expropriate. Accordingly, 
this implies a negative relationship between family ownership and dividend payout in the 
Turkish market. 
In addition, tax considerations may also have an effect on families’ attitudes towards cash 
dividends. In Turkey, domestic individual shareholders and foreign investors (both individuals 
and corporations) have tax advantages on capital gains over cash dividends; hence, they may 
prefer capital gains based on the tax preference theory and impose families to pay none or lower 
dividends, which implies a negative relationship between family ownership and dividend payout. 
On the other hand, uneven tax treatment may not be a concern for families, due to different 
clienteles with their own tax category circumstances consistent with the tax clientele theory. For 
instance, domestic Turkish corporations (both financial and non-financial corporations) generally 
have a neutral tax-treatment with respect to cash dividends and capital gains. Combining the 
ideas from the principal-principal conflict based on the expropriation argument and tax 
considerations, as well as the negative relationship generally reported from other emerging 
markets reported by a few studies, the following hypothesis can be formulated:  
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between family ownership and dividend policy in Turkey. 
Another basic characteristic of Turkish firms are insider boards in addition to 
concentrated family ownership. Owner families govern the boards of Turkish-listed firms and the 
boards are generally used as an internal mechanism of control by the controlling families 
(Yurtoglu, 2003; Caliskan and Icke, 2011). Further, Yurtoglu (2003) reported that at least half of 
the board directors are also members of the owner family in the family-controlled Turkish 
companies. According to the IIF (2005) report, 80% of listed companies in Turkey had at least 
one family member on the board and more than one-third of the board directors were, on 
average, from the controlling family 
Even though many family firm boards have non-executive directors, they are likely to be 
small minorities in terms of numbers (hence taking little parts on the board) and they generally 
serve on the board of subsidiaries, which also minimises their power. In addition, the existence 
of the independent members on the boards is very limited (IIF, 2005; Ararat et al., 2011; 
Caliskan and Icke, 2011). Hence, it can be argued that families generally dominate the boards of 
the ISE-listed firms they control by their direct involvement in many cases, and easily influence 
managerial decisions over the study period. Consistent with the negative relationship between 
family ownership and dividend policy anticipated from the previous discussion, we also 
hypothesise that family control through the board negatively affects dividend policy decisions.  
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between the number of family members on board and 
dividend policy in Turkey. 
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From the agency cost perspective, the size of a board can play a significant role in 
monitoring executive management. Larger boards can provide greater expertise and diversity of 
specialisation as well as outside contacts that a firm may lack internally, and hence more 
efficient monitoring (Fiegener et al., 2000; Gabrielsson, 2007). However, Jensen (1993) argued 
that large boards may be less efficient than smaller boards, since it can be more difficult to 
coordinate between large numbers, and if a board appropriately small with a sufficient number of 
independent directors, it can scrutinize its executive managers in much better way. Based on 
Jensen’s (1993) argument, large boards might indicate weak monitoring. In our context, Turkish 
families are unlikely to appoint boards that will limit their control over their firm’s resources and 
therefore regardless of the size of boards, smaller or larger, it is expected to have a weak 
monitoring role.  
Hence, we assume that the Turkish firms will substitute such weak monitoring services 
with paying dividends, which is in line with the substitution hypothesis (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between board size and dividend policy in Turkey. 
Since Turkey has a liberal foreign policy, there are no constraints on foreign investments, 
repatriation of capital and profits. Foreign investors (both individuals and corporations) can 
freely buy and sell all types of securities and other capital market instruments on the condition 
that they have to use a Turkish intermediary for their capital market activities such as purchasing 
or selling shares, repo, portfolio management, investment consultancy, underwriting, and so on 
(TSPAKB, 2007; 2012).  
After the implementation of the various major economic and structural reforms, including 
the publication of the CMB Principles of corporate governance in 2003, significant 
improvements have been observed in many areas in terms of the legal and institutional 
environment for corporate governance and transparency and disclosure practices in Turkey (IIF, 
2005; Caliskan and Icke, 2011). In addition, the big Turkish financial intermediaries may help 
prevent the information asymmetry that foreign investors suffer, while they are investing in this 
market. Since the Turkish stock market became a promising emerging market with a fast growth, 
it has attracted a significant amount of foreign investment in the post-2003 period (CMB, 2012; 
Adaoglu, 2008). This may indicate that foreign investors invest for stocks in Turkish market for 
their long-run growth potential, not for the short-term cash dividend income, consistent with 
Glen et al.’s (1995) statement. Moreover, the uneven tax treatment between capital gains and 
cash dividends, imposed by the Turkish tax regime, which provides foreign shareholders with tax 
advantages for capital gains over dividends, also implies that foreign investors possibly prefer 
none or lower dividend payouts in order to reduce their tax burden on cash dividends. Therefore: 
H4: There is a negative relationship between foreign ownership and dividend policy in Turkey. 
Greater attention has been paid to the monitoring role of institutional investors in 
dividend policy literature. A number of studies investigated the impact of institutional investors 
on dividend policies of firms listed in emerging markets; however, they generally reported 
evidence supporting two opposing arguments. It is argued that institutional shareholding has a 
positive impact on the dividend policy, consistent with the argument that greater agency conflicts 
and poor legal protection given to the investors in emerging markets mean institutional investors 
fail to directly monitor management, hence they prefer dividend-induced capital market 
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monitoring. Contrarily, another argument suggests that there is a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and dividend payout ratio, which is in line with the argument that 
institutional investors act as a monitoring mechanism on the firm’s management, consequently 
reducing, in general, the need for high dividend payouts.  
In Turkey, two legal entities, namely Turkiye Is Bankasi and OYAK Group, are the most 
common domestic financial institutions controlling a number of ISE-listed companies (Yurtoglu, 
2003). Apart from these two corporations, the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance is still new and the sector is underdeveloped (IIF, 2005). However, the CMB of 
Turkey put serious efforts in creating private pension and mutual funds in 2003 to enhance 
monitoring in public firms’ corporate governance (CMB, 2003; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). 
Although the CMB-regulated pension and mutual funds were relatively small at first, they have 
been growing. Supposedly, as their assets under management increase, they could become an 
important market player if they have the right incentives to contribute actively in the governance 
of the firms in which they invest (OECD, 2006). Accordingly, this implies that institutional 
investors may act as a monitoring mechanism on the firm’s management in Turkey, 
consequently reducing, in general, the need for high dividend payouts. Therefore, we 
hypothesise that:  
H5: There is a negative relationship between domestic institutional ownership and dividend 
policy in Turkey. 
A large number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were founded and managed by the 
state during 1980s (Kepenek and Yenturk, 1996). However, the adoption of privatisation as one 
of the essential tools of the market economy was started in Turkey, from 1986 onwards, in the 
hope of reducing the size of the government and public spending, and increasing private sector 
involvement and foreign direct investment (Karatas, 2009). Furthermore, along with the 
implementation of major reforms in 2003, the new Turkish government accelerated the 
privatisation programme, which included the divestiture of considerably large SOEs. The new 
stage of privatisation process attracted a great amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
Turkey and foreign corporations, partnering with powerful domestic collaborators, managed to 
obtain the ownership of these large SOEs. As a result, together with the abolition of legal 
barriers to enter the Turkish market, a substantial lessening in the state’s direct engagement in 
the economy, increasing private sector, and FDI involvement and ownership may also indicate a 
better corporate governance and transparency and disclosure practices environment in Turkey 
(IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006; Karatas, 2009).  
Privatisation generally provides reasonably more effective organisational structures and a 
substantial improvement in performance of privatised corporations (Megginson et al., 1994; 
Lopez-de-Silanes, 1994). However, it is also possible that privatisation may not work as well as 
intended and may lead to increases in agency costs of managerial control that can be almost as 
serious as the political control in these companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Indeed, the 
important aspect determining the efficiency of an enterprise is not whether it is state-owned or 
privately owned, but how it is managed (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988). In this context, a few 
researchers (Wei et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2011; Lam et al., 2012) reported a positive 
relationship from China, whereas Kouki and Guizani (2009) found a negative relationship in 
Tunisia, between state ownership and dividend payout policy. Therefore, the following opposing 
hypotheses can be formulated:  
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H6a: There is a negative relationship between state ownership and dividend policy in Turkey. 
H6b: There is a positive relationship between state ownership and dividend policy in Turkey. 
The CMB of Turkey re-introduced the mandatory dividend policy starting with the fiscal 
year 2003 until 2008 (however, it was much more flexible than the first mandatory dividend 
policy that imposed to pay 50% of distributable earnings as cash dividends in the earlier years). 
The purpose for re-introducing the mandatory dividend policy was to protect minority 
shareholders rights against the controlling shareholders, since Turkey has a history of poor 
culture of corporate governance, transparency and disclosure practices, and unfair treatment of 
minority shareholders (IIF, 2005; Yurtoglu, 2003). Indeed, Turkish firms are highly dominated 
by families and generally attached to a group of companies, where the controlling shareholders, 
typically families, often use a pyramidal structures or dual-class shares to augment control of 
their firms (Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010).  
From this perspective, it implies that minority shareholders in Turkey might have a taste 
for higher dividends, to reduce the risk of expropriation of their wealth by controlling 
shareholders, as proposed by La Porta et al. (2000) and therefore increasing outside monitoring 
through cash dividend payments, consistent with a number of studies (Rozeff, 1982; Schooley 
and Barney, 1994; Moh’d et al., 1995; Manos, 2002; Farinha, 2003) reported a positive 
relationship between minority owners and payout policy. Therefore:  
H7: There is a positive relationship between minority shareholders ownership and dividend 
policy in Turkey. 
3 Data sample  
First, all companies listed on the ISE (during the period 2003-2012) are considered, 
including “dividend-paying” and “non-dividend paying” firms to prevent the sample selection 
bias.
4
 Second, financial sector (banks, insurers, pension funds, investment trusts) companies and 
utilities (gas, electric, water) are excluded, since they are governed by different regulations and 
follow arguably different investment and dividend polices. Finally, the sample is further 
narrowed down to firms whose accounting and financial data is available on DATASTREAM, 
whereas companies’ ownership and incorporation dates are compiled from the annual reports 
published in the Public Disclosure Platform (KAP) of the ISE and companies’ official websites. 
The validity of the data is also cross checked with OSIRIS. The Stock Exchange Daily Official 
List (SEDOL) codes and International Security Identification Numbers (ISIN) of the companies 
are used to match companies between different databases.  
 
INSERT TALE 2 HERE 
 
The sample selection procedure results in a panel dataset of total 264 companies (non-
financial and non-utility) listed on the ISE during the period 2003-2012, as summarised in Panel 
                                                          
4
 Since the purpose of our study is to examine the effect of ownership structure on dividend policy in Turkey after 
the implementation of major reforms in 2003, we constructed our data sample in the post-2003 period. It would be 
worth if we could extend our sample period to the pre-2003 period to make comparison analysis and identify 
whether there is significant changes between the pre-and post-the 2003 major reforms. However, we suffer from 
data unavailability regarding the pre-2003 period, especially ownership structure information, due to the previously 
mentioned reasons associated with the absence of adequate transparency regulations and disclosure practices. 
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A in Table 2. In order to minimise possible survivorship bias, both companies that delisted (due 
to the mergers and acquisitions, business failure or any other process leading to delisting) and 
companies listed in the different times during this period are all considered and included in the 
sample. As illustrated by Panel B in Table 2, the ISE-listed companies are increasing every year 
because of the new listed firms. Due to the delisted and newly listed companies, the sample is 
not the same for each year but rather it increases during the 10-year period from 2003 to 2012, 
hence this type of panel is called unbalanced panel data.  Panel C in Table 2 presents the 
distribution of the sampled Turkish companies across industries. The sample is classified into 14 
different industries based on ICB codes. However, the sample has a majority of companies in 
only four different industries, namely personal & household goods, industrial goods & services, 
construction & materials and food & beverage (18.6%, 17.4%, 13.3% and 11.7% respectively), 
which are all making up to 61% of all companies in the sample. 
4 Variables descriptions  
We employ three different variables to proxy for the dependent variable. The probability 
of paying dividends is a binary variable, which indicates that such a firm did (DPAY = 1) or did 
not (DPAY = 0) pay dividends in any given year during the period 2003-2012. The intensity of 
paying dividends is measured by two variables; dividend payout ratio and dividend yield. 
Dividend payout ratio (DPOUT) is calculated as the dividend per share is divided by the earnings 
per share, whereas dividend yield (DYIELD) is measured as the ratio of dividend per share to 
price per share for a firm. These two variables take a positive value if such a firm paid dividends 
and they take on a value of zero if the firm did not. 
The following explanatory variables are used as the test variables in the multivariate 
analyses. Two variables are employed to assess the effect of family involvement. Family 
ownership (FAMILY) is measured as the percentage of total outstanding shares of the firm held 
by families, including family members, family managers and family-controlled holding 
companies, in line with prior studies such as Chen et al. (2005), Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009), 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010), Wei et al. (2011) and Gonzalez et al. (2014). Family control 
through the board (FAMBOARD) is defined as the number of family directors on the board 
based on surnames of the founding families
5
 (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010; Wei et al., 2011). 
Further, board size (BOARD) is measured as the number of directors on the board (Chen et al., 
2005; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). 
Moreover, foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is adopted in the same manner of studies 
including Lin and Shiu (2003) and Jeon et al. (2011), and it is measured as the percentage of 
shares of the firm held by foreign corporations, foreign financial institutions and foreign 
nationals in a given year during the research period. Domestic institutional ownership (INST) 
refers to the sum of percentage of Turkish financial institutions such as banks, pension funds, 
investment trusts and insurers out of total capital shares of the firm (in line with studies such as 
Manos, 2002 and Fairchild et al., 2014). Following Wei et al. (2004), Kouki and Guizani (2009), 
Wang et al. (2011) and Lam et al. (2012), state ownership (STATE) is measured as the 
percentage of shares of the firm held by the central government and its wholly owned enterprises 
in a fiscal year over the period 2003-2012. The last proxy for ownership structure (DISP) 
                                                          
5
 These statistics may even understate the true extent of the family control in boards since the study relied on a 
comparison of family names (surnames) in collecting the information regarding family members on boards. 
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represents stock ownership dispersion (Rozeff, 1982; Schooley and Barney, 1994; Moh’d et al., 
1995) and it is measured in a similar manner to Manos (2002) and Farinha (2003), which is the 
total percentage of shares owned by a large number of small (minority) shareholders, who held 
less than 5% of the outstanding shares of the firm.
6
 
The following firm-specific variables are the control variables that have been observed in 
the literature in influencing dividend policy, which might have also been important factors of 
dividend policy decisions in the Turkish market. Particularly, return on assets (ROA), the firm’s 
market-to-book ratio (M/B), debt policy (DEBT), firm age (AGE) and firm size (SIZE). It is 
predicted that return on assets (profitability), firm age and firm size have a positive impact, 
whereas market-to-book ratio (growth) and debt have a negative effect on the cash dividend 
payments of ISE-listed firms.  
Finally, since the sample covers a relatively long time period, year dummies (YEAR) are 
added in all regression models to control for unobserved time-varying factors effect, such as the 
regulatory changes, different periods of the economic cycle, and macroeconomic dynamics, on 
dividend policy (Chen et al., 2005; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Wei et al., 2011). The industry 
dummies (INDUSTRY) are employed to control for industry-specific effects for ISE-listed firms.  
 
5 Research design and models  
We compute random effects logit and tobit regressions models for our multivariate 
analyses.
7
 Since three different dependent variables are employed, the type of the dependent 
variable defines the appropriate econometric technique. Therefore, logit estimation is applied 
when the dependent variable is the probability of paying dividends (DPAY), which is a binary 
variable (0/1). For dividend payout ratio (DPOUT) and dividend yield (DYIELD) variables, 
which are left censored at zero and contain a mixture of continuous and discrete values, tobit 
estimations are used.  
Furthermore, the marginal effects (economic significance) of the independent variables in 
all logit and tobit models are also calculated in order to provide further interpretations of the 
estimation coefficients (statistical significance). The marginal effects show the marginal impact 
of each independent variable on the dependent variable at the mean values of other independent 
variables. In addition, one-year lag values of the independent variables are used in all 
estimations to mitigate the problem of endogeneity.  
Accordingly, the corresponding logit and tobit models are constructed as below:  
Model 1:          Logit (DPAY)i,t  = α + β1FAMILYi,t-1 + β2FAMBOARDi,t-1 + β3BOARDi,t-1 + 
β4FOREIGNi,t-1 + β5INSTi,t-1 + β6STATEi,t-1 + β7DISPi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + β9M/Bi,t-1 + β10DEBTi,t-1 + 
β11AGEi,t-1 + β12SIZEi,t-1 + ∑  𝑇𝑡=1 βtYEARi,t + ∑  
𝑛
𝑗=1 βjINDUSTRYj,i,t + Ɛi,t-1  
                                                          
6
 Under Turkish mandatory provisions and the CMB Principles, all types of shareholders, who own more than 5% of 
any listed company’s capital, either directly or indirectly should be disclosed to the public (CMB, 2003; 2012). 
Therefore, shareholders who hold less than 5% are categorised as small investors.  
7
 We also use pooled logit and tobit regressions models; however, our tests show that the random effects models 
(panel) are more favourable than the pooled models, and therefore we only report the results from the random 
effects logit and tobit models in estimating the impact of ownership structure on dividend policy in the Turkish 
market. 
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Model 2:       Tobit (DPOUT)i,t  = α + β1FAMILYi,t-1 + β2FAMBOARDi,t-1 + β3BOARDi,t-1 + 
β4FOREIGNi,t-1 + β5INSTi,t-1 + β6STATEi,t-1 + β7DISPi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + β9M/Bi,t-1 + β10DEBTi,t-1 + 
β11AGEi,t-1 + β12SIZEi,t-1 + ∑  𝑇𝑡=1 βtYEARi,t + ∑  
𝑛
𝑗=1 βjINDUSTRYj,i,t + Ɛi,t-1  
Model 3:       Tobit (DYIELD)i,t  = α + β1FAMILYi,t-1 + β2FAMBOARDi,t-1 + β3BOARDi,t-1 + 
β4FOREIGNi,t-1 + β5INSTi,t-1 + β6STATEi,t-1 + β7DISPi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + β9M/Bi,t-1 + β10DEBTi,t-1 + 
β11AGEi,t-1 + β12SIZEi,t-1 + ∑  𝑇𝑡=1 βtYEARi,t + ∑  
𝑛
𝑗=1 βjINDUSTRYj,i,t + Ɛi,t-1  
6 Empirical findings  
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the research variables used in the multivariate 
analyses. The panel dataset (unbalanced) includes 264 ISE-listed firms (non-financial and non-
utility) with 2,112 firm-year observations over
8
 the period 2003-2012.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
As the table demonstrates, the mean of DPAY is 0.339, indicating that ISE firms paid 
dividends in almost 34 % of the total 2,112 firm-year observations, whereas in the rest of the 
66% of the total observations they did not.  On average, DPOUT reveals that the sampled firms 
had the dividend payout ratio of 24.3%, while they gained the dividend yield (DYIELD) of just 
below 2% over the entire period. With regard to ownership structure, ISE firms are highly 
concentrated in the hands of families (39.4%) followed by foreign investors (12.7%).  Other 
blockholders show relatively lower shareholdings on average; domestic financial institutions 
hold about 4.1% and the state owns only around 1.6%, possibly reflecting the accelerated 
privatisation programme imposed by the government over the research period, whereas minority 
shareholders hold almost 36% of the outstanding shares of the ISE-listed companies. 
Furthermore, it is found that at least one family member is on the board, which are generally 
sized of seven directors on average. The statistics (DEBT and ROA) report that firms make 
about 25% debt financing in their capital structure and they had only approximately 2% of the 
returns on their total assets invested over the period. The M/B variable demonstrates a mean 
market-to-book ratio of 1.508, which is higher than 1, suggesting that ISE firms have, on 
average, a good prospect of expected growth opportunities.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Table 4 displays the results of Pearson’s correlation and Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
for the independent variables included in the multivariate analyses. The table reveals that there 
are significant relationships between independent variables; however, there is no high correlation 
between any two of the variables, although a few variables are moderately correlated. Moreover, 
the VIF statistics are further used to check whether multicollinearity exists between independent 
                                                          
8
 Each research variables has 2,112 firm-year observations, except dividend payout ratio (DPOUT), which has 2,066 
firm-year observations.  When the firm makes losses, its earnings per share becomes negative and although that firm 
pays some amount of dividends, its dividend payout ratio will be negative since payout ratio is calculated as 
dividend per share divided by earnings per share. However, a firm’s dividend payout ratio cannot be negative; 
therefore such observations are excluded while measuring the DPOUT variable. 
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variables. As a rule of thumb, the VIF values larger than 10 generally suggest multicollinearity. 
Tolerance (calculated as 1/VIF) is also computed to check the degree of multicollinearity; if a 
tolerance value is lower than 0.1, which corresponds to a VIF value of 10, it implies 
multicollinearity. As reported in the table, none of the VIF values exceeds 10, nor are the 
tolerance values smaller than 0.1, the results therefore suggest that there is no serious 
multicollinearity.  
Table 5 reports the results of logit and tobit regressions. Particularly, Model 1 presents 
the random effects logit estimations on the probability of paying dividends, whereas Model 2 and 
Model 3 in the same table show the random effects tobit estimations on dividend payout ratios 
and dividend yields of ISE-firms, respectively.
9
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
The results indicate that Model 1, 2 and 3 are all overall statistically significant at the 1% 
level as evidenced by the Wald X
2
 tests. Similarly, the likelihood-ratio tests are statistically 
significant at the 1% for Model 1, 2 and 3, indicating that the proportion of the total variance, 
contributed by the panel-level variance component, rho, values  are significantly different from 
zero (0.6231, 0.3309 and 0.5221 respectively). This suggests that panel (random effects) models 
are more favourable than pooled models.  
In order to investigate how family involvement influences dividend policy, two family 
effect variables are created, namely family share ownership (FAMILY) and family control 
through the board by family members (FAMBOARD). The logit regression (Model 1) shows no 
significant relation between the family involvement variables and the probability of paying 
dividends, since the coefficients and the marginal effects of both variables are negative but not 
statistically significant at any conventional significance levels. This is inconsistent with the 
expropriation argument proposed by Sheleifer and Vishy (1997), Anderson and Reeb (2003) and 
Villalonga and Amit (2006). However, the tobit regressions (Model 2 and 3) reveals 
contradictory results to the logit estimations. Particularly, the coefficients of FAMILY (z = 
−2.51, p < 0.05 in Model 2 and z = −1.92, p < 0.10 in Model 3) and FAMBOARD (z = −1.78, 
p < 0.10 in Model 2 and z = −2.26, p < 0.05 in Model 3) are both negative and statistically 
significant in tobit models. Further, the marginal effects of FAMILY, all else being equal, 
suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in this variable will approximately results in a 2.012 
percentage point decrease in the level of dividend payout ratio and a 0.806 percentage point 
decrease in the amount of dividend yield. Similarly, the marginal effects show that a 10 
percentage point increase in FAMBOARD will roughly decrease the dividend payout ratio by a 
0.039 and drop the dividend yield by a 0.116 percentage point for an average firm.  
This negative relationship is consistent with the evidence provided by Faccio et al. 
(2001) in East Asia and Wei et al. (2011) in China. Therefore, the tobit results imply that 
families in Turkey may exacerbate expropriation of wealth from minority investors by paying 
lower dividends in line with the principal-principal conflict. Overall, the results reveal that 
family involvement does not affect ISE firms’ decisions to pay dividends or not, but it pushes 
them to distribute lower dividends. Hence, we partially accept H1 and H2 that family 
involvement (through both share ownership and board representation) has a negative effect on 
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 It is worth noting that since we use one-year lagged values of the independent variables to mitigate the endogeneity 
problem, the logit and tobit analyses of the dividend payment decisions are based on 1,846 firm-year observations, 
except the tobit analysis of dividend payout ratios, which is based on slightly lower firm-year observations of 1,800 
due to the previously explained problem associated with measuring payout ratios.  
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dividend policy in Turkey. Nevertheless, considering the non-significant impact of Turkish 
families on the likelihood of paying dividends, the evidence for expropriation argument for 
Turkish families is relatively weak - if the expropriation argument using dividends holds true for 
Turkish families, their control should also be significantly and negatively affecting the 
probability of paying dividends.  
The results in Table 5 report that there is strong evidence of a positive relationship 
between board size (BOARD) and dividend payment decisions. The coefficients on the BOARD 
are positive and statistically significant in all models (z = 3.09, p < 0.01 in Model 1, z = 2.51, p 
< 0.05 in Model 2, and z = 3.33, p < 0.01 in Model 3). The marginal effects of this variable, 
other things being equal, indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in BOARD will 
approximately result in a 0.264 percentage point increase in the likelihood of paying dividends, a 
0.158 percentage point increase in the amount of dividend payout ratio, and a 0.213 percentage 
point increase in the amount of dividend yield for an average firm. This positive relationship is in 
line with the substitution hypothesis (La Porta et al., 2000) and thus this leads us to accept H3.  
Among non-family blockholders, foreign ownership (FOREIGN) has a significantly 
negative impact on the ISE-firms’ corporate dividend decisions. The logit regression (Model 1) 
shows that the coefficient estimate on the FOREIGN variable is negative and statistically 
significant (z = −2.05, p < 0.05). The tobit regressions (Model 2 and 3) show similar results; 
particularly, negative and statistically significant coefficient estimates on FOREIGN (z = −3.28, 
p < 0.01 and z = −1.97, p < 0.05 respectively). The marginal effects of this variable, all else 
being equal, suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in foreign ownership will approximately 
result in a 2.125 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of paying dividends, a 2.593 
percentage point drop in the dividend payout ratio, and a 1.652 percentage point decline in the 
dividend yield for an average ISE-listed firm. This means that higher foreign ownership leads to 
lower dividend payments, which is consistent with Glen et al. (1995) and Lin and Shiu (2003), 
and may suggest that foreign investors, in Turkey, invest in stocks for their long-run growth 
potential, rather than the short-term dividend income. The evidence might also be reflecting the 
uneven tax treatment between capital gains and cash dividends imposed by the Turkish tax 
regime, which provides foreign shareholders with tax advantages for capital gains over 
dividends, and therefore foreign investors possibly prefer none or lower dividend payouts in 
order to reduce their tax burden on cash dividends. Therefore, we accept H4.  
Moreover, the results indicate that domestic financial institutions (INST) shareholdings 
have no impact on the ISE firms’ decisions on whether to pay dividends. The coefficient and 
marginal effect of the variable are negative but not statistically significant at any conventional 
significance levels in Model 1. On the other hand, the tobit regressions detect that INST 
significantly and negatively affects the level of payout ratio (z = −2.37, p < 0.05 in Model 2) 
and the amount of dividend yield (z = −1.88, p < 0.10 in Model 3). The marginal effects of 
INST suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in this variable will approximately results in a 
2.251 percentage point decrease in the payout ratio and a 0.914 percentage point decrease in the 
dividend yield for an average firm. Accordingly, the evidence suggests that although Turkish 
institutional investors have no significant impact on the likelihood of paying dividends, their 
increasing ownership in general reduce the need for high dividend payments. Hence, we partially 
accept H5.  
The results further show that there is strong evidence of a negative relationship between 
state ownership (STATE) and dividend policy in Turkey. The coefficients on the STATE 
variable are negative and statistically significant in all models (z = −1.97, p < 0.05 in Model 1, z 
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= −2.45, p < 0.05 in Model 2, and z = −2.35, p < 0.05 in Model 3). The marginl effects of this 
variable, other things being equal, indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in STATE will 
approximately result in a 2.745 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of paying dividends, 
a 2.931 percentage point drop in the dividend payout ratio, and a 1.670 percentage point decline 
in the dividend yield for an average firm. This finding is consistent with Kouki and Guizani 
(2009) but is in contrast with the evidence of Gugler (2003), Wei et al. (2011), Wang et al. 
(2011) and Lam et al. (2012). Indeed, the evidence may imply that the implementation of major 
reforms in 2003, including the accelerated privatisation programme executed by the Turkish 
government, provide relatively more efficient ownership structures which resulted in better 
corporate governance, transparency and disclosure practices environment in Turkey, and 
therefore the state ownership is involved with less need for the dividend-induced capital market 
monitoring. Hence, we accept H6a. 
In the same manner with FAMILY, FAMBOARD and INST variables, minority (small) 
investors’ ownership (DIPS) has no significant effect on the likelihood of paying dividends but is 
found to have significant and negative coefficients in the panel tobit models (z = −2.40, p < 0.05 
in Model 2 and z = −1.69, p < 0.10 in Model 3).  The marginal effects of the variable suggest 
that a 10 percentage point increase in DISP will decrease the dividend payout ratio by about a 
2.291 percentage point and the dividend yield by roughly a 0.221 percentage point. This 
evidence of the inverse relationship between minority shareholders and dividend policy is 
contrary to the statement of La Porta et al. (2000), that minority shareholders might have a taste 
for higher dividends to reduce the risk of expropriation of their wealth by controlling 
shareholders, and inconsistent with a number of studies (Rozeff, 1982; Schooley and Barney, 
1994; Moh’d et al., 1995; Manos, 2002; Farinha, 2003). Nevertheless, it implies that small 
shareholders have preferences for capital gains over cash dividends, perhaps to avoid tax burden 
due to a favourable tax treatment on capital gains provided by the Turkish tax regime, which is 
in line with Lam et al. (2012), who reported a negative relationship for the same reason in China. 
Therefore, we reject H7.  
Finally, Table 5 shows that five control variables (firm-specific factors) are found to be 
robustly significant in all models, influencing corporate dividend decisions in Turkey. As 
predicted, the results from logit and tobit regressions indicate that profitability (ROA), firm age 
(AGE) and firm size (SIZE) have positive coefficients and marginal effects, and investment 
opportunities (M/B) and debt (DEBT) have negative coefficients and marginal effects. These 
results suggest that more profitable, more mature and larger sized firms are more likely to pay 
dividends (and distribute higher dividends), whereas firms with higher growth opportunities and 
with more debt are less likely to pay dividends (and distribute lower dividends) in the Turkish 
market.  
Furthermore, we conduct additional tests by separating the two family involvement 
variables in each regression model to check whether the main results are sensitive to the usage of 
each family influence variable alone.  As illustrated in Table 6, the findings are not significantly 
different – in fact, very similar – to what we report in Table 5.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
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7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of ownership structure on dividend policy in 
Turkey, after the implementation of major reforms in 2003, where an ideal setting is provided to 
study the role of ownership concentration on corporate dividend decisions in an emerging market 
(a civil law originated), which employed the common laws in order to integrate with world 
markets.  
Our results indicate that ISE-listed firms have highly concentrated ownership structures 
and are mostly owned by families followed by foreign investors, while other blockholders, 
Turkish financial institutions and the state, show relatively lower shareholdings. In this context, 
we find that foreign and state ownership are associated with a less likelihood of paying 
dividends, while other ownership variables are insignificant in affecting the probability of a 
Turkish firm to pay cash dividends. However, all the ownership variables, family effect (through 
both ownership and board representation), foreign investors, domestic financial institutions, the 
state and minority investors ownerships, have a significantly negative impact on the amount of 
dividend payouts and dividend yield of ISE firms.  
Accordingly, we present consistent evidence that foreign investors in Turkey invest in 
stocks for their long-run growth potential, rather than the short-term dividend income. This may 
be implying that, along with the significant improvements in many areas for corporate 
governance and transparency and disclosure practices in Turkey since 2003, the increase in 
foreign ownership provides more monitoring on the managements’ activities and hence less need 
for the dividend-induced monitoring device. Further, it may also be reflecting the uneven tax 
treatment between capital gains and cash dividends imposed by the Turkish tax regime, which 
provides foreign shareholders with tax advantages for capital gains over dividends, and thus 
foreign investors possibly prefer none or lower dividend payouts in order to reduce their tax 
burden on cash dividends. Moreover, our findings show evidence that state ownership and 
dividend policy are negatively correlated, which may suggest that,  after the implementation of 
major reforms starting with the fiscal year 2003, including the accelerated privatisation 
programme that included the divestiture of considerably large SOEs executed by the Turkish 
government, provide relatively more efficient ownership structures, which resulted in better 
corporate governance, transparency and disclosure practices environment in Turkey and, 
therefore, state ownership involving less with the need for the dividend-induced capital market 
monitoring.  
The expropriation argument based on the principal-principal conflict argues that when 
large shareholders (especially families) hold almost full control, they prefer none or lower 
dividends to preserve cash flows that they can potentially expropriate. Nevertheless, our results 
report inconclusive evidence in this respect. Although families have a significantly negative 
effect on dividend payments, considering the non-significant impact of Turkish families on the 
decisions to pay or not pay dividends (if the expropriation argument through dividends holds true 
for Turkish families, their involvement should also be significantly and negatively affecting the 
probability of paying dividends) and the significantly negative relationships between cash 
dividend payments and all other blockholders and even minority shareholders, the evidence of 
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expropriation argument for Turkish families is relatively weak. In fact, this negative correlation 
may suggest that families are likely to cater for the dividend preferences of their shareholders, 
consistent with the catering theory of dividends developed by Baker and Wurgler (2004).  
Similarly, domestic financial institutions and minority investors’ stock ownership have 
no significant effect on decisions regarding whether to pay dividends, but they are both 
significantly and negatively affecting dividend payments. Hence, higher stock ownership of 
domestic financial investors in an ISE firm associates with lower dividend ratio, which is 
contrarily to the argument that greater agency conflicts and poor legal protection given to the 
investors in emerging markets, fail institutional investors in directly monitoring the management; 
thus, they prefer dividend-induced capital market monitoring. Indeed, our evidence suggests that 
the increasing ownership of Turkish institutional investors reduces in general the need for high 
dividend payouts, which may be due to their efficient monitoring on the firms’ management. 
Further, the evidence of the inverse relationship between the minority shareholders and the 
payout ratio is contrary to the statement of La Porta et al. (2000), that minority shareholders 
might have a taste for higher dividends to reduce the risk of expropriation of their wealth by 
controlling shareholders. Instead, it implies that small shareholders have preferences for capital 
gains over cash dividends to possibly avoid from tax burden due to a favourable tax treatment on 
capital gains provided by the Turkish tax regime. 
Even though the outcome model of dividends, proposed by La Porta et al. (2000), argues 
that dividends are an outcome of an effective system of legal protection of shareholders, and 
therefore suggests higher dividends payments, it also predicts that, other things being equal, 
firms with better investment opportunities should in general pay lower payout ratios in countries 
with good shareholder protection. Based on this argument, our results imply that the 
implementation of various major economic and structural reforms in cooperation with the IMF 
and the EU directives and best-practice international standards, including the CMB’s Corporate 
Governance Principles in line with the World Bank and the OECD, starting with the fiscal year 
2003, have resulted significant improvements for the ISE-listed firms corporate governance, 
transparency and disclosure practices and better shareholder protection. Consequently, investors 
in general have preference for the potential long-run growth opportunity for the stocks they hold 
in the ISE, since Turkey is a fast-growing market.  
Overall, our findings reveal that cash dividends are not used as a monitoring mechanism 
by investors in order to control for agency problems in Turkish market. Among many other 
possibilities (some already discussed above), this evidence may also refer to the declining 
propensity of paying dividends in line with Fama and French (2001), who argued that the 
perceived benefits of dividends have decreased through time; perhaps due to the larger holdings 
of stock options by managers (large controlling shareholders in this case, families or foreign 
investors) who prefer capital gains to dividends and better corporate governance technologies 
that lower the benefits of dividends in controlling agency problems. This raises the need for 
further research regarding the effect of corporate governance and ownership structure on 
dividend policy behaviour. The results of this paper, however, provide a valuable benchmark for 
such a research.  
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                          Table 1: Taxation of Capital Gains and Dividends on Equities in Turkey 
 
Investment 
Individuals Corporations 
Residents Non-residents Residents Non-residents 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital Gains 
on Equities 
 
Capital gains 
derived from 
shares subject to 
0% withholding 
tax. However, the 
shares of 
investment trusts 
and exchange 
traded funds are 
subject to 10% 
withholding tax, if 
held for less than a 
year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% withholding 
tax. 
 
Capital gains 
derived from 
shares subject to 
0% withholding 
tax. However, the 
shares of 
investment trusts 
and exchange 
traded funds are 
subject to 10% 
withholding tax, if 
held for less than a 
year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% withholding 
tax. 
 
 
 
 
Dividends on 
Equities 
 
 
 
15% withholding 
tax is applied by 
the corporation 
distributing 
dividends. 
 
 
 
15% withholding 
tax is applied by 
the corporation 
distributing 
dividends. 
 
Not subject to 
dividend 
withholding tax. 
Dividends 
received from 
resident 
incorporations are 
exempt from 
corporate tax. 
 
 
 
 
15% withholding 
tax is applied by 
the corporation 
distributing 
dividends. 
     Source: Compiled from TSPAKB (2007; 2012) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Selection Criteria and Distributions of the Sample across Time and Industries 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel C 
Selection Criteria for the sample 
 Distribution of the 
sample across time 
 
Distribution of the sample across industries 
  
Criterion 
No. of 
firms 
 
Years 
 No. of 
firms 
 
Industry  
ICB 
Code 
Sample 
(%)    
           
ISE-firms   
380 
 2003  157  Oil & Gas   500 1.5 
during 2003-2012  2004  164  Chemicals  1300 5.7 
   2005  199  Basic Resources  1700 5.7 
Financial Firms  111  2006  211  Construction & Materials  2300 13.3 
Utilities     5  2007  214  Industrial Goods & Services 2700 17.4 
   2008  215  Automobiles & Parts 3300 4.2 
Final Sample  264  2009  218  Food & Beverage 3500 11.7 
(Excluding financials   2010  226  Personal & Household Goods 3700 18.6 
& utilities)   2011  249  Health Care 4500 1.5 
    2012  259  Retail 5300 5.7 
        Media  5500 2.7 
        Travel & Leisure  5700 6.4 
        Telecommunications  6500 0.8 
        Technology  9500 4.9 
            
        Total   100% 
        Number of Firms   264 
 
  Notes: ICB code provides Industry Classification Benchmark code for industries based on Datastream. 
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        Table 3: Descriptive statistics  
 
      Variables  N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
 
DPAY  2,112 0.339 0.473 0.000 1.000 
 
DPOUT 2,066 0.243 0.911 0.000 21.05 
 
DYIELD 2,112 0.019 0.040 0.000 0.063 
 
FAMILY 2,112 0.394 0.298 0.000 0.969 
 
FAMBOARD 2,112 1.551 1.634 0.000 7.000 
 
BOARD 2,112 6.622 2.070 3.000 14.00 
 
FOREIGN 2,112 0.127 0.268 0.000 0.995 
 
INST 2,112 0.041 0.158 0.000 0.973 
 
STATE 2,112 0.016 0.096 0.000 0.981 
      
DISP 2,112 0.358 0.201 0.005 1.000 
 
ROA 2,112 0.021 0.185           −5.120 1.059 
 
M/B 2,112 1.508 1.322 0.284 18.66 
 
DEBT 2,112 0.249 0.542 0.000 10.76 
 
AGE 2,112 3.445 0.499 1.098 4.477 
 
SIZE 2,112 4.863 1.712 0.513 10.16 
Note: DPAY is  a dummy variable indicating firms paying dividends; DPOUT is the dividend payout level; DYIELD  is the dividend 
yield ratio; FAMILY is the percentage of total outstanding shares of the firm held by families including family members; FAMBOARD is 
the number of family directors on the board; BOARD is the number of directors on the board; FOREIGN is the percentage of shares of 
the firm held by foreign corporations, foreign financial institutions and foreign nationals; INST is the sum of percentage of Turkish 
financial institutions such as banks, pension funds, investment trusts and insurers out of total capital shares of the firm; STATE is the 
percentage of shares of the firm held by the central government and its wholly owned enterprises; DISP is  the 
total percentage of shares owned by a large number of small (minority) shareholders; ROA is firm’s return on assets; M/B is firm’s 
market-to-book ratio; DEBT is the debt policy;  AGE is firm’s age in years; Size is firm’s size measured as market capitalisation 
of firm.  
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               Table 4: Pearson’s correlations and VIF values  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 VIF 1/VIF 
               
 1.  FAMILY   1.000            4.42 0.226 
 2.  FAMBOARD  0.568**   1.000           1.63 0.613 
 3.  BOARD  −0.063**   0.045** 1.000          1.53 0.653 
 4.  FOREIGN  −0.448** −0.321**   0.063**   1.000         3.46 0.289 
 5.  INST  −0.316** −0.242**   0.040**    −0.144**     1.000        1.87 0.535 
 6.  STATE  −0.207** −0.151**   0.032**    −0.038**      −0.034**  1.000       1.36 0.735 
 7.  DISP     −0.249**   0.057**    −0.126**    −0.419**   −0.077**   −0.046**      1.000      2.88 0.347 
 8.  ROA  −0.021** −0.020   0.211**      0.049**     0.021**     0.015   −0.123**     1.000     1.46 0.684 
 9.  M/B  −0.108** −0.072**  −0.018**      0.125**     0.081**     0.010     0.122**  −0.144** 1.000    1.46 0.684 
10. DEBT  0.027**   0.041**   −0.170**    −0.057**     0.058** −0.035     0.037**  −0.498**   0.458**    1.000   1.76 0.568 
11. AGE  0.023**   0.042**  0.122**     0.080**     0.116**     0.066**   −0.144**  −0.005**   −0.091**      0.035** 1.000  1.11 0.900 
12. SIZE  −0.071** −0.088**  0.538**     0.217**     0.139**     0.153**   −0.340**    0.301** 0.152**     −0.157**  0.146** 1.000 1.86 0.537 
 
Notes: ** and * stands for significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively; variables are defined in Table 3.  
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Table 5: Results of estimation models on dividend payment decisions 
 
Model  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Random effects logit  Random effects tobit  Random effects tobit 
       
Dependent variable 
 Dividend payment 
DPAY (0/1) 
 Dividend payout ratio 
DPOUT 
 Dividend yield 
DYIELD 
           
Independent 
variables 
 Coefficient 
estimates 
Marginal 
effects 
 Coefficient 
estimates 
Marginal 
effects 
 Coefficient 
estimates 
Marginal 
effects    
           
FAMILY 
 -1.1118 -0.1003  -1.6226** -0.2012**  -0.0218* -0.0806* 
 (-0.95) (-0.96)  (-2.51) (-2.54)  (-1.92) (-1.93) 
           
FAMBOARD 
 -0.0189 -0.0017  -0.0337* -0.0039*  -0.0031** -0.0116** 
 (-0.14) (-0.14)  (-1.78) (-1.79)  (-2.26) (-2.26) 
           
BOARD 
 0.2925*** 0.0264***  0.1277** 0.0158**  0.0057*** 0.0213*** 
 (3.09) (3.19)  (2.51) (2.54)  (3.33) (3.38) 
           
FOREIGN 
 -2.3554** -0.2125**  -2.0909*** -0.2593***  -0.0477** -0.1652** 
 (-2.05) (-2.10)  (-3.28) (-3.39)  (-1.97) (-1.98) 
           
INST 
 -1.5697 -0.1416  -1.8156** -0.2251**  -0.0247* -0.0914* 
 (-1.10) (-1.11)  (-2.37) (-2.40)  (-1.88) (-1.89) 
           
STATE 
 -3.0417** -0.2745**  -2.3636** -0.2931**  -0.0452** -0.1670** 
 (-1.97) (-1.98)  (-2.45) (-2.48)  (-2.35) (-2.36) 
           
DISP 
 -0.3048 -0.0275  -1.8475** -0.2291**  -0.0120* -0.0221* 
 (-0.23) (-0.23)  (-2.40) (-2.43)  (-1.69) (-1.69) 
           
ROA 
 11.709*** 1.0568***  6.0372*** 0.7487***  0.3150*** 1.1627*** 
 (8.03) (8.55)  (7.73) (7.97)  (13.48) (13.63) 
           
M/B 
 -0.3751*** -0.0338***  -0.2128*** -0.0263***  -0.0090*** -0.0333*** 
 (-3.30) (-3.38)  (-3.20) (-3.24)  (-4.33) (-4.33) 
           
DEBT 
 -4.0674*** -0.3671***  -1.5526*** -0.1925***  -0.0811*** -0.2995*** 
 (-4.84) (-4.92)  (-3.26) (-3.28)  (-5.41) (-5.41) 
           
AGE 
 0.8982** 0.0810***  0.3294* 0.0408*  0.0237*** 0.0876*** 
 (2.18) (2.21)  (1.80) (1.81)  (2.84) (2.87) 
           
SIZE 
 1.0687*** 0.0964***  0.4987*** 0.0618***  0.0155*** 0.0573*** 
 (6.99) (7.91)  (6.05) (6.51)  (5.41) (5.68) 
           
Constant  
 -8.4581***   -3.3581***   -0.1762***  
 (-4.64)   (-3.48)   (-4.93)  
           
Industry dummies   Yes Yes   Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Time dummies   Yes Yes   Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
No. of observations  1,846 1,846  1,800 1,800  1,846 1,846 
           
Wald X2  198.83***   217.47***   381.72***  
           
Rho value   0.6231   0.3309   0.5221  
           
Likelihood ratio test  280.09***   120.43***   313.65***  
           
Notes: The table reports the logit/tobit estimations and z statistics in the parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Independent variables are one-year lagged; variables are defined in Table 3.   
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Table 6: Results of further specifications on dividend payment decisions 
 
Model  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Random effects logit Random effects tobit Random effects tobit 
          
Dependent variable 
Dividend payment 
(DPAY (0/1)) 
Dividend payout ratio 
(DPOUT) 
Dividend yield 
(DYIELD) 
              
Independent  
variables 
Coefficient 
estimates 
Marginal 
effects 
Coefficient 
estimates 
Marginal 
effects 
Coefficient 
estimates 
Marginal 
effects 
Coefficient 
estimates 
Marginal 
effects 
Coefficient 
estimates 
Marginal 
effects 
Coefficient 
estimates  
Marginal 
effects 
              
FAMILY 
-1.1761 -0.1061 
− − 
-1.7068** -0.2116** 
− − 
-0.0330* -0.1216* 
− − 
(-1.09) (-1.10) (-2.55) (-2.57) (-1.90) (-1.91) 
             
FAMBOARD − − 
-0.0682 -0.0062 
− − 
-0.0949* -0.0118* 
− − 
-0.0040* -0.0149* 
(-0.55) (-0.55) (-1.73) (-1.73) (-1.87) (-1.87) 
             
BOARD 
0.2906*** 0.0262*** 0.3052*** 0.0278*** 0.1243** 0.0154** 0.1504** 0.0187** 0.0054*** 0.0199*** 0.0060*** 0.0223*** 
(3.10) (3.20) (3.25) (3.37) (2.50) (2.52) (2.49) (2.51) (3.15) (3.21) (3.51) (3.58) 
             
FOREIGN 
-2.3655** -0.2135** -1.5310** -0.1394** -2.1056*** -0.2611*** -1.9097*** -0.1133*** -0.0469** -0.1727** -0.0284** -0.1055** 
(-2.06) (-2.12) (-2.05) (-2.08) (-3.32) (-3.43) (-3.16) (-3.20) (-2.04) (-2.08) (-2.06) (-2.11) 
             
INST 
-1.5638 -0.1411 -0.7635 -0.0695 -1.8098** -0.2244** -0.6766** -0.0843** -0.0242* -0.0892* -0.0087* -0.0325* 
(-1.10) (-1.11) (-0.67) (-0.68) (-2.36) (-2.39) (-2.09) (-2.11) (-1.86) (-1.88) (-1.80) (-1.82) 
             
STATE 
-3.0426** -0.2746** -2.2817** -0.2077** -2.3569** -0.2922** -1.2769** -0.1591** -0.0440** -0.1619** -0.0298** -0.1109** 
(-1.99) (-2.01) (-1.97) (-1.98) (-2.44) (-2.47) (-2.47) (-2.48) (-2.32) (-2.35) (-2.33) (-2.33) 
             
DISP 
-0.3048 -0.0303 -0.6012 -0.0547 -1.8942** -0.2349** -1.5241** -0.0653** -0.0113* -0.0417* -0.0109* -0.0406* 
(-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.63) (-0.65) (-2.51) (-2.54) (-2.49) (-2.52) (-1.67) (-1.69) (-1.78) (-1.79) 
             
ROA 
11.709*** 1.0565*** 11.793*** 1.0739*** 6.0322*** 0.7480*** 6.2108*** 0.7741*** 0.3140*** 1.1548*** 0.3164*** 1.1747*** 
(8.03) (8.54) (8.13) (8.72) (7.72) (7.95) (8.01) (8.28) (13.39) (13.55) (13.60) (13.90) 
             
M/B 
-0.3751*** -0.0339*** -0.3682*** -0.0335*** -0.2146*** -0.0266*** -0.1989*** -0.0247*** -0.0091*** -0.0337*** -0.0088*** -0.0330*** 
(-3.30) (-3.39) (-3.25) (-3.33) (-3.24) (-3.28) (-3.00) (-3.03) (-4.39) (-4.39) (-4.28) (-4.27) 
             
DEBT 
-4.0674*** -0.3672*** -4.0584*** -0.3695*** -1.5565*** -0.1930*** -1.5324*** -0.1910*** -0.0812*** -0.2989*** -0.0811*** -0.3010*** 
(-4.84) (-4.92) (-4.86) (-4.95) (-3.26) (-3.28) (-3.26) (-3.28) (-5.38) (-5.40) (-5.43) (-5.44) 
             
AGE 
0.8982** 0.0808*** 0.8840** 0.0805*** 0.3252* 0.0403* 0.3084* 0.0384* 0.0233*** 0.0857*** 0.0232*** 0.0863*** 
(2.18) (2.20) (2.15) (2.17) (1.79) (1.80) (1.71) (1.73) (2.77) (2.80) (2.80) (2.82) 
             
SIZE 
1.0687*** 0.0965*** 1.0557*** 0.0961*** 0.5001*** 0.0620*** 0.4780*** 0.0595*** 0.0157*** 0.0579*** 0.0152*** 0.0566*** 
(6.99) (7.93) (6.94) (7.85) (6.07) (6.54) (5.81) (6.22) (5.47) (5.74) (5.36) (5.61) 
             
Constant  
-8.4581***  -9.1835***  -3.3175***  -4.4289***  -0.1724***  -0.1893***  
(-4.64)  (-5.53)  (-3.46)  (-5.02)  (-4.81)  (-5.77)  
             
Industry dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
              
Time dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
             
No. of observations 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 
             
Wald X
2 
198.83***  199.01***  217.45***  214.03***  379.15***  382.76***  
             
Rho value  0.6231  0.6232  0.3311  0.3359  0.5262  0.5195  
             
Likelihood ratio test 280.09***  279.71***  120.60***  122.07***  320.25***  313.40***  
             
Notes: The table reports the logit/tobit estimations and z statistics in the parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Independent variables are one-
year lagged; variables are defined in Table 3. 
